Abstract
Terrestrial sinks have entered the Kyoto Protocol as offsets for carbon sequestration, but ocean sinks have escaped attention. Ocean sinks are as unexplored and uncertain as were the terrestrial sinks at the time of negotiation. It is not unlikely that certain countries will advocate the inclusion of ocean carbon sinks to reduce their emission reduction obligations. We use a simple model of the international market for carbon dioxide emissions to evaluate who would gain or loose from allowing for ocean carbon sinks. Our analysis is restricted to information on anthropogenic carbon sequestration within the exclusive economic zone of a country. Like the carbon sequestration of business as usual forest management activities, natural ocean carbon sequestration applies at zero costs. The total amount of anthropogenic ocean carbon sequestration is large, also in the exclusive economic zones. As a consequence, it substantially alters the costs of emission reduction for most countries. Countries such as Australia, Denmark, France, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Portugal would gain substantially, and a large number of countries would benefit too. Current net exporters of carbon permits, particularly Russia, would gain less and oppose the inclusion of carbon sinks.

Keywords
carbon dioxide emission reduction, emission permit trade, exclusive economic zones, ocean sinks

JEL Classification
Q540, Q580
1. Introduction

There are two options for limiting the increase of carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere: emission reduction, and sink enhancement. In the Kyoto Protocol, Annex B countries agreed on emission reduction targets. However, terrestrial sinks have entered the Kyoto Protocol as offsets for carbon sequestration. The negotiations on “land use, land use change and forestry” (LULUCF) were among the most complicated and contentious. Some countries have exploited the uncertainties to renegotiate their earlier emission reduction targets through the back door.

Besides terrestrial sinks, there are also ocean sinks.\(^1\) Ocean sinks have escaped attention, although marine carbon flows are large and the science is as uncertain and complex as for terrestrial sinks. One can therefore expect that, sooner or later, a country will claim that the carbon sunk in its part of ocean, is sunk partly by deliberate intervention,\(^2\) and that this should be used as an offset against its emissions targets. This paper explores the implications.

Most of the economic literature on carbon dioxide sinks is placed in the context of the Kyoto Protocol and relates to terrestrial carbon sequestration. Eligible activities under the Protocol are afforestation, reforestation, forest management, cropland management, grassland management and revegetation (UNFCCC, 1997).\(^3\) A number of studies address the potential benefits of carbon sequestration in the land use sector and their related costs.\(^4\) Others deal with the issue of non-permanence of carbon sequestration in the terrestrial biosphere and its environmental, as well as policy and economic implications (e.g. IPCC, 2000; Chomitz, 2000; Dutschke, 2002; Ellis, 2001; Fearnside, 2000; Jung, forthcoming; Kirschbaum, 2003; Missfeldt and Haites, 2001; Moura-Costa and Wilson, 2000; Noble and Scholes, 2001).

Marchetti (1977), Parson and Keith (1998), IEA (2001), and Gielen (2003) study the potential contribution of geological and ocean carbon storage. Technologies for geological storage are available and first projects have been initiated (Gale, 2003; Holloway, forthcoming). For ocean storage, there are two approaches: injecting captured CO\(_2\) into the deep ocean, and fertilizing the ocean with nutrients to increase the draw-down of CO\(_2\) from the atmosphere (IEA, 2002).


Proponents of carbon capture and storage technologies claim that it is an option for buying time while preparation for emission reductions are made (IEA, 2002). However, cost estimates vary widely with capture technology, transport distance and medium as well as storage reservoir and depth chosen. There are profitable options as in the case of enhanced oil recovery (EOR) and options costing up to € 100 per tCO\(_2\) (see e.g. David and Herzog, 2001; Hendriks et al., 2001 and 2004). Also, carbon storage bears new environmental risks which are currently not well understood. Carbon might not be permanently stored and rapid or slow releases of injected emissions could occur. This might not only have impacts on the environment, ecosystems or human health, but also on the effectiveness of temporary carbon storage.

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\(^1\) Note that there is carbon capture and storage as well. However, this is to be accounted for as emission reduction and not as removal activities, since the emissions never enter the atmosphere.

\(^2\) Ocean fertilization is the most discussed deliberate intervention. However, in the LULUCF negotiations, the interpretation of deliberate intervention was stretched considerably to include things that were neither deliberate nor interventions, like e.g. most forest management.

\(^3\) See Article 3.3 and 3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1997). A specification of these articles can be found in the Marrakech Accords (UNFCCC, 2001a and b).

\(^4\) For an overview see e.g. Richards and Stokes (2004).
Apart from possible CO₂ injection and sequestration by e.g. iron fertilization, the ocean is also a natural sink of atmospheric CO₂. Almost 50% of the anthropogenic emissions are removed by ocean uptake and exchange fluxes with the terrestrial biosphere (Sabine et al., 2004). Terrestrial sinks are partly included in the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Countries can offset emissions by LULUCF activities. Some of the forestry activities, especially parts of forest management, will apply at zero cost, because they can be considered business as usual and will take place anyway. The accounting of forest management was, therefore, limited by a country-specific cap (see Appendix Z of the Marrakech Accords; UNFCCC, 2001a). These caps reflect to a large extent a country’s bargaining power during the negotiations.

Although the last few years have seen a growing interest in the potential of ocean carbon sinks to limit climate change, they have so far not seriously been considered in climate policy. Neither the natural sink of carbon, nor injection or fertilization are eligible options. A new round of negotiations is supposed to start in 2005. It will have to agree on emission reduction targets and relating rules and modalities for any commitment period beyond the year 2012. Ocean sinks are as unexplored and uncertain as was LULUCF in 1997. It is not unlikely that ocean sinks will be brought up in future negotiations, either as a way to complicate (and hence delay) negotiations, or as a way to offset nominal emission reduction targets.

Regarding ocean sinks and international climate policy, we analyze a counterfactual: What would have happened had the Kyoto Protocol allowed for ocean carbon sinks? The advantage of taking this case is that we do not compare two hypothetical cases (a second commitment period with and without ocean sinks) but rather one hypothetical and one real case. We aim to investigate who would gain most from introducing ocean sinks (and is therefore likely to propose their use), who would gain modestly (and is therefore unlikely to oppose), and who would lose (and is therefore likely to oppose).

We apply data on anthropogenic carbon sequestration within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of a country. The EEZ is the maritime zone seawards of the terrestrial sea with an outer boundary to up to 200 nautical miles out of the terrestrial sea’s baseline. According to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, within this zone the country has the sovereign right to explore and exploit, conserve and manage living and non-living resources in the water column and on the seafloor. However, the overlap of national claims and extended jurisdictions has led to areas with disputed ownership and jurisdiction.

We are aware that it is unlikely that countries will be able to account for the entire natural ocean sink and use the anthropogenic (human-induced) CO₂ uptake within a country’s EEZ instead. Since factoring-out of human-induced uptake from natural uptake will be difficult, countries might try to account for a fraction of the total uptake. Thus, the total uptake serves as a maximum value that a country would want to argue for.

The paper is built up as follows. Section 2 reviews carbon sinks and sources, and maps one particular data set to the exclusive economic zones of countries. Section 3 presents a simple

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5 This is due to ‘gross-net accounting’ which does not consider sinks in the calculation of base year emissions (Article 3.7 Kyoto Protocol).
6 Russia e.g. was able to double the amount of forest management cap during the negotiations at COP7 (Fry, 2002).
7 Actually, the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol will only start in 2008, but its details are well-established.
model of the costs of emission reduction, with and without trade, and with and without offsets for carbon sinks. Section 4 shows and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.

2. Ocean carbon sinks

Human activity (e.g. fossil fuel burning and land-use change) has led to higher atmospheric CO\textsubscript{2} concentration and will lead to global warming and other significant climatic changes over the next century and beyond. However, without the exchange fluxes with the terrestrial biosphere and the ocean uptake of anthropogenic emissions, the concentration would have been much higher. Yet, the potential for carbon storage differs widely with respect to place and time. According to Houghton (2002) and Rödenbeck \textit{et al.} (2003) the Northern hemisphere land is mainly a sink, while the Southern hemisphere land regions are neutral with the tropical land regions taking up carbon.

The global sea-to-air fluxes of CO\textsubscript{2} are dominated by outgassing of CO\textsubscript{2} in upwelling regions in such as the equatorial Pacific and Atlantic and the Arabian Sea. High influx of CO\textsubscript{2} in the Southern Ocean and in the Northern high latitudes can be attributed to photosynthetic utilization of CO\textsubscript{2} in summer and, in some areas, to strong cooling and deep water formation (Takahashi \textit{et al.}, 2002).

The uptake of anthropogenic CO\textsubscript{2} is different to the actual flux of CO\textsubscript{2}, as the preindustrial flux has to be subtracted. The difference is extremely difficult to measure. Therefore we use results from a model simulation by Wetzel \textit{et al.} (forthcoming). In general, the uptake of anthropogenic CO\textsubscript{2} is high where ‘older’ waters, which have not been in contact with the atmosphere for a long time, are brought to the surface; such as in the Northern and Southern high latitudes and in the equatorial upwelling regions. Particularly in the subtropics, the oceanic CO\textsubscript{2} partial pressure follows the partial pressure of the atmosphere almost directly and the uptake is low.

Over the next decades, as CO\textsubscript{2} levels increase, the oceanic buffer capacity will decrease, and the ability of the ocean to absorb more CO\textsubscript{2} diminishes (Revelle and Suess, 1957). Also, because of climate feedbacks, coupled climate-ocean models suggest that the ocean uptake of anthropogenic CO\textsubscript{2} may become less efficient in the future (Matear and Hirst, 1999).

Wetzel \textit{et al.} (forthcoming) use a state-of-the-art ocean/sea-ice general circulation model (MPI-OM) coupled on-line to a marine biogeochemistry model (HAMOCC5). The horizontal resolution of the model gradually varies between 20 km in the Arctic and about 350 km in the Tropics. The global anthropogenic air-to-sea CO\textsubscript{2} fluxes from the model were overlaid with the Maritime Claims and Boundaries Database (GMBD) to measure the carbon flux within a countries exclusive economic zone. The GMBD is a GIS based database offering detailed information on agreed, disputed and hypothetical boundaries for every coastal nation in the world. The derived information was then used to calculate the average annual amount of CO\textsubscript{2} flux for each country.\textsuperscript{9} Table 1 displays the size of the exclusive economic zones and the amount of carbon dioxide flux (anthropogenic uptake) for all Annex I countries, for two cases: undisputed, disputed and hypothetical ownership, and undisputed only. For countries with disconnected exclusive economic zones, the numbers were added. Note that a negative sign indicates ocean carbon uptake.

\textsuperscript{9} Information on the average carbon flux is based on monthly data for the period 1990 to 2003.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>Anthropogenic Carbon flux (000 tons CO₂ per year)</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>undisputed</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>10,640,119</td>
<td>10,597,638</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Exclusive undisputed, disputed and hypothetical ownership; ** exclusive undisputed ownership; + Difference in flux between present and preindustrial times.

Source: Own calculation based on GMBD and Wetzel et al. (forthcoming).
If we would have included information on exclusive fishing zones, the areas for some countries would have been larger, with different values for the carbon flux. This applies mainly to the UK (2,526,338 km$^2$), Denmark (2,247,710 km$^2$) and Ireland (407,489 km$^2$).

Before the concept of the EEZ was established in the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea in 1982, most countries claimed exclusive fishing zones. In contrast to fishing zones, EEZ jurisdiction involves duties as well as rights (UNCLOS Part V). It is straightforward to turn fisheries zones into exclusive economic zones, extending fisheries rights to rights over mineral resources as well as, presumably, carbon dioxide.

3. The market

Above, we considered ocean carbon sinks. These have a value only if they can be used as an offset against emission reduction obligations. In this section, we introduce a simple model of the international market in carbon dioxide emission permits. This model allows to evaluate the implications of the inclusion of ocean carbon sinks on the costs of emission reduction and their distribution. It also allows us to evaluate who would win and loose from including ocean carbon sinks.

Let us consider a market for tradable emission reduction permits with $I$ countries. Emission reduction costs $C$ are quadratic. Each country solves the problem:

$$(1a) \min_{R_i, P_i} C_i = \alpha_i R_i^2 Y_i + \pi P_i \text{ s.t. } R_i E_i + P_i \geq E_i - A_i$$

$R$ is proportional emission reduction; $Y$ is gross domestic product; $P$ denotes the amount of emission permits bought or sold; $\pi$ is the emission permit price; assuming a perfect market, all companies face the same price; $E$ are the emissions; $A$ are the allocated emission permits; that is, if a country emits more than has been allocated, $E > A$, it will have to reduce emissions or buy permits on the market; $\alpha$ is a parameter; country are indexed by $i$. If a country’s allocation exceeds its emissions, $E < A$, the optimization problem is:

$$(1b) \min_{R_j, P_j} C_j = \alpha_j R_j^2 Y_j - \pi R_j E_j + \pi P_j \text{ s.t. } P_j \geq E_j - A_j$$

We assume that the country sells its hot air $P = E - A$, and in addition reduces emissions by $RE$ which it sells at the market for $\pi RE$. Fixing $A$, we in fact assume that countries with hot air do not have market power. Countries with hot air are indexed by $j$.

Countries without emission reduction targets are excluded from the market. Although such countries could supply emission permits through the Clean Development Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, the transaction costs of this are high, so that the actual supply is likely to be limited.

The first order conditions of (1) are:

$$\begin{align*}
2\alpha_i R_i Y_i - \lambda_i E_i &= 0, i = 1, 2, ..., I \\
2\alpha_j R_j Y_j - \pi E_j &= 0, j = 1, 2, ..., J \\
\pi - \lambda_i &= 0, i = 1, 2, ..., I \\
R_i E_i + P_i - E_i + A_i &= 0, i = 1, 2, ..., I \\
P_j - E_j + A_j &= 0, j = 1, 2, ..., J
\end{align*}$$

10 The other countries are the Netherlands (66,730 km$^2$), Australia (30,223 km$^2$), Norway (2,735 km$^2$), the Russian Federation (2,735 km$^2$), France (82 km$^2$) and Italy (67 km$^2$).
where \( \lambda \) denotes the Lagrange multiplier. This is a system with \( 3(I+J) \) equations and \( 3(I+J) + 1 \) unknowns, but we also have that aggregate supply must equal aggregate supply, that is

\[
(2d) \quad \sum_{i=1}^{I} P_i + \sum_{j=1}^{J} P_j - \sum_{j=1}^{J} R_j E_j = 0
\]

which allows us to solve for the permit price \( \pi \) as well. (2) solves as:

\[
(3a) \quad \pi = \lambda_i = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{I} (E_i - A_i) + \sum_{j=1}^{J} (E_j - A_j)}{\sum_{i=1}^{I} E_i^2 / 2\alpha_i Y_i + \sum_{j=1}^{J} E_j^2 / 2\alpha_j Y_j}
\]

\[
(3b) \quad R_i = \frac{\pi E_i}{2\alpha_i Y_i}; R_j = \frac{\pi E_j}{2\alpha_j Y_j}
\]

\[
(3c) \quad P_i = E_i - A_i - \frac{\pi E_i}{2\alpha_i Y_i}; P_j = E_j - A_j
\]

So, the permit price goes up if the emission reduction obligation increases or if the costs of emission reduction increase. All companies face the same marginal costs of emission reduction, and the trade-off between reducing emissions in-house and buying or selling permits is driven by the ratio of marginal emission reduction costs and the permit price. The modeled market behaves as expected. Note that the solution without the market in emission permits \( (P_i=0) \) is trivial.

Rehdanz and Tol (forthcoming) consider the special case \( I=2 \). Rehdanz and Tol (2004) expand the model to two periods, including dynamic permit allocation and banking and borrowing.

Following Tol (2003), we specify

\[
(4) \quad \alpha_i = 1.57 - 0.17 \left\{ \frac{E_i}{Y_i} - \min_i \frac{E_i}{Y_i} \right\}
\]

which states that countries that emit a lot of (little) carbon relative to their production, have low (high) emission reduction costs. This specification was calibrated to the literature review of Hourcade et al. (1996 and 2001). It gives emission reduction costs for each country in the world for which we have emissions and GDP data.

For the numerical illustration we collected data for the period 1990 to 2010. The year 2010 refers to the middle of the first commitment period. Data on emissions (measured in tons CO\(_2\)) and GDP (measured in constant 1995 US $) for 1990, 1995 and 2000 were taken from the World Resources Institute. The data for emissions and GDP were projected to 2005 and 2010 using information on the average annual percent change for the period 2001 to 2025 (IEA, 2004). Data on population was taken from the World Resources Institute for the whole period from 1990 to 2010. Emission reduction targets are those of the Kyoto Protocol. Although ocean sinks are obviously not part of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, we use this hypothetical case because data are relatively sound and abatement targets known. We multiplied the average annual anthropogenic CO\(_2\) sunk by three to account for the period 2008-2010. Data on allowable terrestrial sinks were taken from the UNFCCC (the so called Appendix Z of the Marrakech Accords; see UNFCCC, 2001a). This data refers

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to the allowable accounting of forest management towards the reduction targets and is given in tons of carbon per year.\footnote{LULUCF in Annex I countries is considered by deducing the country specific forest management caps from the respective emission reduction targets.} To account for the maximum amount of emission reduction in the first commitment period the data was multiplied by three (and converted into tons of CO\textsubscript{2} per year). Both sinks used here are zero cost sinks.

4. Results

Based on the model described above and the emission reduction targets agreed to in the Kyoto Protocol, we calculated the emission reduction obligation for each Annex I country for the year 2010, the middle year of the first commitment period. Table 2 presents the costs of emission reduction for twelve different cases. We distinguish six cases, and analyze each with and without permit trade:

- I: no LULUCF and no ocean sinks
- II: no ocean sinks but LULUCF (country-caps under forest management)
- III: no LULUCF but ocean sinks for exclusive economic zones with undisputed ownership (ocean sinks are restricted to 10% of the anthropogenic uptake for the first commitment period)
- IV: no LULUCF but ocean sinks for exclusive economic zones with undisputed, disputed and hypothetical ownership (ocean sinks are restricted to 10% of the anthropogenic uptake for the first commitment period)
- V: no LULUCF but ocean sinks for exclusive economic and fishing zones with undisputed ownership (ocean sinks are restricted to 10% of the anthropogenic uptake for the first commitment period)
- VI: LULUCF and ocean sinks for exclusive economic zones with undisputed ownership (ocean sinks are restricted to 10% of the anthropogenic uptake for the first commitment period)

Without international permit trade, ocean carbon sinks would reduce costs, particularly in Australia, France, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, and Portugal. This is true even if only 10% of all “anthropogenic” carbon is counted (scenario III). Australia and the UK sink substantial carbon in the disputed parts of their exclusive economic zone (scenario IV). Denmark and Ireland would benefit if fishing zones are included (scenario V). See Table 2.

The results confirm that international trade reduces the costs of emission reduction. If countries would be allowed to account for ocean carbon sinks, this would reduce total costs further. The effect of a 10% use of ocean carbon sinks within a country’s undisputed exclusive economic zone (scenario III) is marked. Most permit selling countries would loose, while most buyers show significant gains. Gains are particularly pronounced for countries such as France, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Portugal, who become net exporters of carbon permits. If its disputed EEZ is counted, Australia would also become a carbon exporter. An increase in the percentage use of ocean carbon sinks (not displayed) would be especially beneficial for Australia, Canada, France, Japan, New Zealand, the UK and the US.

Most permit sellers would prefer to exclude ocean sinks, as they would sell less permits on the market and would gain less from emission permit trade. These losses are substantial, ranging from 18% (Latvia) to 43% (Hungary) in scenario III; Russia loses 21% of its revenues. As disputed EEZs and fishing zones are included, losses increase further. However, these
countries would still gain from exporting permits; ocean carbon sinks would make them gain less, but would not lead to net costs of greenhouse gas emission reduction.

Comparing scenario III to scenario II (ocean carbon sinks versus forest management under LULUCF), most permit buying countries are better off under the scenario II. Only Australia, France, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Portugal would prefer ocean sinks to terrestrial sinks. Compared to the LULUCF scenario with a total allowable reduction under forest management of 767 000 tCO$_2$ for Annex I countries, scenario III allows for a total maximum reduction of 296 000 tCO$_2$ only. Setting the percentage use of ocean carbon sinks to allow for a total reduction of 767 000 tCO$_2$ in scenario II, Canada, Greece, Italy and Spain would join the above group preferring ocean carbon sinks. Even if the anthropogenic carbon flux for all exclusive economic zones including zones with undisputed, disputed and hypothetical ownership (scenario IV) is used to reduce emission reduction obligations, the effect is the same. Cost savings are again large for example for Australia, Norway and New Zealand. If fisheries zones are included (scenario V), Denmark would also gain considerably from the inclusion of ocean sinks.

In scenario VI, we compare the hypothetical case where both terrestrial sinks (country-caps under forest management) and ocean carbon sinks (for exclusive economic zones with undisputed ownership, restricted to 10% of the anthropogenic uptake for the first commitment period) are allowed. The total allowable reduction for Annex I countries is further decreased to 1 073 000 tCO$_2$. The positive and negative effects for most countries would be more pronounced compared to scenarios II and III. Only a few countries would gain less (Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland).
Table 2: Emission reduction targets and costs of emission reduction for Annex I countries for different cases (in million US$). \(^{13}\)

Countries with numbers in bold gain from the inclusion of (ocean) sinks, countries in italics lose.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Reduction target (%) rel. to 1990</th>
<th>No sinks and no LULUCF</th>
<th>No Trade</th>
<th>Trade</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>No LULUCF</td>
<td>Sinks (un-disputed, 10%)</td>
<td>Sinks (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>III</td>
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5. Discussion and conclusion

We analyze the implications of ocean carbon sinks on international climate policy. A number of conclusions emerge. First, anthropogenic ocean carbon sinks (rather, the difference between current and pre-industrial ocean carbon sinks) are significant, also in the exclusive economic zones, compared to the terrestrial carbon sinks claimed in the Marrakech Accords. Second, although global emission reduction costs of all countries are affected by the inclusion of ocean carbon sinks (a corollary of the first conclusion), a few countries would face considerably lower costs for meeting their emission reduction obligations. These countries are Australia, France, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal and, perhaps, Denmark (if it were to claim its fisheries zone as an exclusive economic zone). These countries have large ocean areas. Third, these countries would gain more under a system of international trade in emission permits. Fourth, the losses for big carbon permit exporters (e.g. Russia) would be substantial (again, a corollary of the first conclusion).

Therefore, it seems fair to predict that, at some time during the international negotiations on the second, perhaps third commitment period, its rule and emission reduction obligations, one or more of the above-mentioned countries will propose that ocean carbon sinks can be used as an off-set against emission abatement obligations. A few countries would gain substantially, and a larger number of countries would gain less. Of course, there would be opposition to this proposal, coming from two sides. Net exporters of carbon permits in the situation without ocean carbon sinks would gain less, but they would still gain and their opposition to ocean carbon sinks would easily be classified as “the pot calling the kettle black”. Environmentalists would also protest. However, ocean carbon sinks are small compared to the terrestrial sinks included in the Marrakech Accords.

The analysis above is in many ways rudimentary, but the conclusions are robust nonetheless. The amount of carbon sunk in the ocean is uncertain, and so is the difference between the amount sunk at present and the amount sunk in pre-industrial times. However, we widely varied the ocean carbon sink in our scenarios, and the basic structure of the conclusions did not change. The details of the spatial distribution of ocean carbon sinks are very uncertain, too. We did not vary this, but most studies would agree with the basic spatial pattern used here. The costs of emission reductions are uncertain, but this uncertainty makes ocean carbon sinks more or less relevant. It changes the intensity with which countries would argue for inclusion of ocean carbon sinks, not the argument itself. Finally, we used the first commitment period to study the implications of ocean carbon sinks, rather than the second commitment period in which they may surface. However, countries’ roles are unlikely to change in the near future. The countries of the OECD are likely to remain the drivers behind emission reduction, the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are likely to continue to supply cheap emission reduction, and the countries with large swathes of ocean would continue to benefit from the inclusion of ocean carbon sinks. The political dynamics would change, if ocean carbon sources would count as well. Countries with substantial net outgassing of carbon dioxide in their exclusive economic zones, however, are in the tropics. These countries are unlikely to accept emission reduction obligations any time soon.

Therefore, we are reasonably confident in our prediction that ocean carbon sinks will be tabled at the international climate negotiations in the foreseeable future. Although it is certainly possible that there would be technical negotiations as contracted as those on LULUCF, ocean carbon sinks are much smaller and therefore less damaging to global emission abatement efforts.
Acknowledgements

We would like to thank General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems (Herndon, USA) and in particular Lorin Pruett for making their Global Marine Boundaries Database available to us. Martin Pratt directed us to this database. Jenny Behm, Helko Hansen and André Krebber provided welcome help arranging the dataset. The CEC-DG Research’s Fifth Framework Programme through the ORFOIS project (EVK3-CT-2001-20001) and the NOCES project (EVK2-CT-2001-00134), the International Max Planck Research School of Earth System Modelling, and the Michael Otto Foundation provided welcome financial support. All errors and opinions are ours.

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